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This paper compares the productivity and other characteristics of vertically integrated 
and non-integrated firms to investigate whether efficiency gains associated with a given 
liberalisation episode vary across firms, depending on their organisation. A theoretical setting 
of vertical integration in the textile and clothing industry is developed, to reveal that trade 
expansion triggers a change in the relative factor cost of these two types of firms, and 
consequently, a change in product range produced by them. The results are further backed by 
using a sample of clothing firms in Pakistan for the years 1992-2010 to analyse the effect of 
the phasing out of U.S. textile and clothing quotas on firm-level efficiency. The empirical 
findings illustrate that an increase in the level of quotas brings about a significant growth in the 
mean productivity of vertically integrated clothing firms. The diminishing efficiency of non-
integrated firms points to the lack of ability of these firms to benefit from tighter quality 
control, timely revision of production policies and guarantee of supplies. 
JEL Classification: F13, F14, D24, L23 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Do efficiency gains associated with a given liberalisation episode vary across firms 
depending on their organisation? There are a large number of both theoretical as well as 
empirical studies which attempt to measure the effect of a greater exposure to 
international markets on firm and industry productivities. In the context of trade 
liberalisation and its impact on firm efficiency, what has still remained a relatively 
understudied subject is the diverging outcome of a given liberalisation regime on 
different types of firms. If a certain trade policy change creates contrasting outcomes 
across different groups of firms, empirical methodologies based on aggregated data or 
assuming homogeneity in the effect of a liberalising episode are highly likely to produce 
ineffectual results. In this paper, we strive to tackle this weakness in the existing 
literature. In particular, we compare the productivity of vertically integrated and non-
integrated firms within a country, allowing both types of firms to engage in international 
trade, and analyse how trade liberalisation affects the efficiency of these firms differently. 
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By making use of detailed data, available for an industry which usually comprises of both 
vertically integrated and non-integrated companies, we analyse the experience of clothing 
firms in Pakistan under the U.S. Textile and Clothing (T&C) quotas and the subsequent 
end of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA). Our paper utilises data on the amount of 
quotas under the MFA and the succeeding Agreement on Textile and Clothing (ATC), 
along with the company-level data set of a representative sample of T&C companies in 
Pakistan, and thus, provides an excellent context of trade liberalisation in a developing 
country, which heavily relies on the export of textile products. 
Vertical integration is the configuration of production under which one business 
unit carries on sequential stages in processing/distribution of a manufactured good which 
is sold by other firms without additional processing [Blois (1972)]. In line with the 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory, founded by Williamson (1975), internal 
organisation of a firm needs to be designed in such a way so as to improve incentives and 
control agency costs. The literature has identified a range of factors associated with 
integration [Acemoglu, et al. (2005)]. Firms integrate vertically to erect entry barriers, 
maintain product quality, assist investments in specialised assets and develop 
coordination [Williamson (1975)]. Companies often vertically integrate to ensure that the 
supply of key inputs is readily available. Most of these companies often produce more 
inputs than they need and sell the remainder [Hortaçsu and Syverson (2012)]. Managerial 
oversight, customer contacts and marketing know-how are just some of the many benefits 
enjoyed by vertically integrated firms. 
The advantages must be weighed against disadvantages, which usually consist of 
disparities between productive capacities at different stages of production, lack of 
specialisation and lack of direct competitive pressure on costs of products [Blois (1972)]. 
Nevertheless, there is modest micro-level evidence on productivity-integration 
relationship and on how production differs in vertically integrated firms compared to 
non-integrated firms. There is an even lesser evidence on the impact of trade 
liberalisation on productivity of vertically integrated firms. There is a growing literature 
on international specialisation of production and its impact on firm efficiency. Expansion 
of international specialisation and disintegration of production has been an important 
characteristic of the international economy [Antràs and Helpman (2004)].
1
  However, the 
focus of this literature has been on productivity gains associated with disintegration of 
production across different countries.  
In this paper, we analyse the effect of trade liberalisation on the productivity of 
firms exporting T&C products. The way we define liberalisation in this paper is by a 
gradual lifting of trade quotas on the exports of textile and clothing products from 
developing to developed countries, characterised by the MFA. The MFA enforced 
restrictions on T & C exporters, and the Uruguay Round (1994) ended the MFA by 
signing the ATC. ATC commenced the practice of integrating T&C products into 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
Integration occurred across four phases. In Phase I, countries were to incorporate 
products, representing 16 percent of their 1990 import volumes. At the start of Phases II 
and III on January 1st, 1998 and January 1st, 2002, respectively, further 17 and 18 
 
1Hummels, et al. (2001) demonstrate that international trade has grown faster in components than in 
final goods. 
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percent of 1990 export volumes were integrated. Lastly, on January 1st, 2005, Phase IV 
of the ATC integrated the outstanding 49 percent of export volumes, with all quotas 
abolished. Other than removing quotas, the ATC enhanced developing countries’ access 
to the developed countries, by speeding up quota growth over the four phases through the 
“growth-on-growth” provision [Brambilla, et al. (2007)]. Expiration of these quotas was 
expected to bring about considerable reallocation of production and exports across 
countries, including Pakistan, for which the T&C sector is an imperative industry. 
Although there are a number of studies which investigate the efficiency of vertically 
integrated firms relative to non-integrated firms, none of these in particular consider the 
influence of trade liberalisation caused by phasing out of quotas on firm-level efficiency 
of these two types of firms. We explain how trade liberalisation generates a greater 
incentive for vertical integration in the production of clothing goods. 
The most important contribution of this study is the theoretical setup, created to 
generate the differential outcomes for the two types of firms. The theoretical background 
to vertical integration in clothing industry shows that liberalisation causes a change in 
relative factor cost of the two types of firms, and therefore, a change in product range 
produced by each of them. Liberalisation in home country results in an increase in 
product range, produced by vertically integrated firms.  Moreover, the theory is further 
substantiated by the empirical models used in the following sections. The empirical 
findings demonstrate that an upsurge in the level of quotas generates a significant 
decrease in mean productivity of clothing firms that are not vertically integrated. This is 
in contrast to the conventional wisdom, according to which the T&C industry of Pakistan 
would perform much better in the quota free regime, given that it was apparently 
constrained by the MFA quotas. The result is also intriguing because it corroborates the 
argument in favour of vertical integration of production, at least in the T&C industry. 
The paper is organised as follows: In Section 2, we concisely go over the recent 
literature on vertical integration of production and the influence of trade on firms. Section 
3 provides a theoretical background to vertical integration in T&C industry. We will then 
illustrate our methodology. Empirical results are presented in Section 5 while Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
In order to motivate the diverse outcomes in terms of distinct firm performance as 
a result of liberalisation, it would be appropriate to review the literature on integration 
choices of firms. Acemoglu, et al. (2005) obtain cross-country correlations between 
vertical integration and financial development, contracting costs and entry barriers. When 
credit markets are imperfect and when there is lack of financial development, there are 
more likely to be larger firms in a country [Kumar, et al. (1999)]. These firms are prone 
to produce some of their own inputs. Therefore, improved financial institutions and credit 
markets may perhaps be associated with not as much of vertical integration [Acemoglu, 
et al. (2005)].  
Babe (1981) makes productivity comparisons of integrated and non-integrated 
Canadian telephone companies, in order to determine the net effect of vertical integration 
on efficiency of telephone operations. Vertical integration results in lower costs to 
telephone operations in the form of reduced contracting and selling costs. Conversely, 
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vertical integration brings about inefficiency on the part of telephone companies, owing 
to the possibility that desirable technology available only from unaffiliated suppliers may 
be foreclosed. Atalay, Hortaçsu, and Syverson (2013) point towards an alternative 
explanation for vertical ownership, namely that it promotes efficient intra-firm transfers 
of intangible inputs. 
Hortaçsu and Syverson (2007) use a rich plant-level data set of cement and ready-
mixed concrete producers to reflect on the reasons and results of vertical integration, with 
particular regard to its effects on market power. Contrasting total factor productivity 
(TFP) changes among formerly non-integrated plants shows that plants that become 
integrated, witness approximately 10 percent faster productivity growth. Hortaçsu and 
Syverson (2009) make use of the Longitudinal Business Database to study the 
productivity of plants in vertically structured firms. They discover that vertically 
integrated plants have higher productivity levels than their non-integrated industry 
cohorts. 
In the context of textile industry, an incredibly valuable and applicable study that 
compares the performance of firms under various management conditions is that by 
Braguinsky, et al. (2015). Using the Japanese cotton spinning industry data, they analyse 
ties between productivity, profitability and ownership as clear mechanisms to spur the 
industry’s growth. Although the principal objective of their study is to quantify the result 
of acquisitions and management turnover; numerous findings generated in the paper offer 
strong empirical support to the ones we display in the present study, for example, the 
influence on profitability. 
Lots of developing countries have initiated programs of trade liberalisation. Hay 
(2001) investigates effects of the 1990 Brazilian trade liberalisation on the market share, 
profit and productivity of 318 manufacturing firms. A production function for the period 
1986-94 shows sizeable TFP gains in the period up to 1994. The effect of trade 
liberalisation on the productivity of Pakistani firms is best examined by Liaqat (2013). 
The study measures productivity, using a technique that deviates from the assumptions of 
perfect competition and constant returns to scale, and employs numerous specifications 
using input and output tariff data to compute efficiency. The results imply that not only 
there is a rise in competition following trade liberalisation but also a reduction in the 
returns to scale for most industries. Likewise, there is no strong evidence of an 
improvement in productivity after trade reforms were introduced in the manufacturing 
sectors of Pakistan. 
The effect of quota phase-outs in the form of the end of MFA on firm-level 
efficiency has recently been analysed by Liaqat (2014). The study uses a sample of textile 
and clothing companies to display that MFA expiration leads not only to an increase in 
the average productivity of textile producing firms but a significant reduction in the mean 
productivity of clothing producers. Liaqat (2014) offers a number of explanations for this 
outcome, such as, a change in the input and product mix, entry by non-exporters in the 
clothing sector and sectoral differences in quality ladders, and draws some crucial policy 
lessons from this study. Despite its remarkable results, Liaqat (2014) makes no 
distinction between the clothing firms, producing their own inputs as opposed to the ones 
buying raw materials from other textile companies. In fact, the vertically integrated 
clothing firms are referred to as clothing firms alone, regardless of their production of 
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T&C industry intermediate goods. As shown in the theoretical and empirical models 
below, this is a very strong assumption and may produce potentially distorted estimates. 
In that respect, the current study goes one step further in underscoring the heterogeneity 
within the textile and clothing firms by distinguishing between vertically integrated and 
non-integrated clothing firms. 
Therefore, none of the contemporary papers considers the effect of trade 
liberalisation caused by phasing out of quotas on firm-level efficiency of the two types of 
firms. This paper is the first one to emphasise the variation in the effect of MFA 
termination, across firms depending on their organisation. 
 
3.  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Subsequent to the above analysis, it would be useful to compare productivity of 
clothing producers that buy their raw materials (either from domestic producers or from 
abroad), and productivity of vertically integrated clothing producers that manufacture 
their own yarn and fabric. In this section, we describe how trade liberalisation generates 
an incentive for vertical integration in the T&C industry. We follow the model by Yi 
(2003). Trade liberalisation triggers a change in relative factor cost of the two types of 
firms, and consequently, a change in product range produced by each of them. We 
consider two special cases of free-trade equilibrium which generate complete 
specialisation in the production of all goods. 
Consider three types of firms having the following production functions: 
  
 ( )     
 ( )   
 ( )    
 ( )       … … … … … (1) 
  
 ( )     
 ( ) [  
 ( )   
 ( )    
 ( )   ]
   
    … … … … (2) 
  
 ( )     
 ( )   
 ( )    
 ( )       … … … … … (3) 
where i = H or F (H denoting home production and F denoting foreign production), and 
          indicates product z produced by the firm.   
 ( ) is the TFP of firm f in the 
production of good z in country i, and   
 ( ) and   
 ( ) are labour and capital used by firm 
f  in producing output   
 ( )  The first type of firm produces raw materials purchased by 
the second type, i.e.   
 ( )      
 ( ), where   
 ( ) is firm 2’s use of output produced by 
firm 1. The second type of firm combines input produced by the first type, labour and 
capital in a nested Cobb-Douglas production function. In our case, it suggests that the 
first type produces textile products and the second type buys textile products from type 
one firm and uses them to produce the final good, for example, ready-made garments. 
The third type of firm also produces the final good but, unlike the second type of firm, 
produces its own raw materials.  
 
Firms and Technology 
Let us only consider the home industry. Firms maximise profits taking prices as 
given. The profit maximisation problem for type 1 firm is given by: 
    {  ( )  ( )     ( )      ( )}                   
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and that for type 2 firm: 
    {  ( )  ( )    ( )  ( )     ( )      ( )}                     
if the firm buys only domestically produced raw materials from type one firms.   ( ) is 
the world price of textile raw materials,   ( ) is price of the final good, and   and   are 
the wage and rental rates. If firm 2 buys imported raw materials, profit maximisation 
problem is given by: 
    {  ( )  ( )    ( ) (    )  ( )     ( )      ( )}                     
where τ is a measure of trade liberalisation, for example, tariff rate or price of quota 
license. Since firms 2 and 3 both produce the same final good, the market price for their 
output will be identical (  ( )    ( )). Therefore, profit maximisation problem for type 
3 firm is given by: 
    {  ( )  ( )     ( )      ( )}                 . 
 
Households 
The utility maximisation problem of households is specified as: 
    ∑     (  
 )      
w.r.t.     
   
     
  [    
   (    )  
 ]     
   
     
   
     
     
   
   
     
   (    )  
      
            
where   
  and   
  are the price and output of the final good in country i at time t.   
  is 
consumption,   
  and   
  are total capital and labour,    
  is investment, and   
  is the lump-
sum transfer of quota license revenue, expressed in terms of the home final good. 
Households own the capital and rent it to firms period by period. 
 
Market Clearing 
The market clearing condition for good 1 (textile – raw material) is: 
   ( )     
 ( )     
 ( )     
 ( )     
 ( )  
and market clearing condition for good 2 (apparel – finished good) is: 
    ( )     ( )     
 ( )     
 ( )     
 ( )     
 ( )  
    ( )      ( )     
  [    
   (    )  
 ]     
                      
This is because both firms 2 and 3 provide an identical finished good to the market. 
Market clearing conditions for labour and capital markets, respectively, are given by: 
     ∫   
 ( )  
 
 
  ∫   
 ( )  
 
 
  ∫   




     ∫   
 ( )  
 
 
  ∫   
 ( )  
 
 
  ∫   




Let the textile raw materials (good 1) be the numeraire, i.e.    ( )     and 
   ( )     ( )   
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Definition of Equilibrium 
An equilibrium is a sequence of goods and factor prices, {   ( )     ( ) 
  
    
        
 }, and quantities {    
 ( )    
 ( )    
 (  )    
 (  )    
 (  )    
 (  ) 
   
 (  )    
 (  )    
 (  )    
 (  )       
  }                  for i = H, F such that the 
first order conditions of firm’s and household’s maximisation problems given above, as 
well as market clearing conditions, are satisfied. 
For the sake of simplicity, let us remove the time subscript. The profit 
maximisation problem of first type of firm can be written as: 
    {  (   )  
    
            }                   
The productivity,   ( ), is a function of τ plus all other factors that influence firm 
productivity, denoted by . Productivity is affected by a number of factors, such as, 
worker skills, energy outages, off-balance sheet transaction costs, corruption, security and 
infrastructure. The profit maximisation problem for type 2 firm is: 
    { (  
     (   )  
    
       )              }                      
if the firm buys only domestically produced raw materials. Alternatively, if the firm buys 
imported raw materials, profit maximisation is given by: 
    { (  
     (   )  
    
       )  (    )            }                      
Similarly, we obtain the profit maximisation problem for type 3 firm. We can 
derive an expression for relative productivity 
  (  )
  (  )
  by using the first order conditions 
for type 2 and type 3 firms (see Appendix 1): 
  ( )    
  ( )
  ( )
  
  (  )
  (  )
  
(    )(   )
 ( )(   )
  … … … … (4) 
Hence, relative productivity is a function of τ as well as all other factors that affect 
firm productivity. Let us consider two different cases as examples of free-trade 
equilibrium which generate complete specialisation in the production of all goods. Trade 
liberalisation in the form of a reduction in price of quota license causes a reduction in 
relative factor cost of firm 2 compared to firm 3. In other words, the relative factor cost 
of firm 3 will go up. This is shown in Figure 1. The vertical axis measures relative 
productivity and relative factor cost of firm 3 relative to firm 2. On the horizontal axis, 
with no loss of generality, the [0, 1] continuum can be arranged so that it is diminishing 
in productivity of firm 3 relative to firm 2 in the home country; z = 0 is the good in which 
firm 3’s productivity (relative to that of firm 2) is the highest. The “cutoff”    defines the 
pattern of production. The arbitrage condition that determines the cutoff separating 
production between firms 2 and 3 can be found by equating relative factor cost to relative 
productivity. The condition essentially says that vertically integrated firm (i.e. firm 3) 
produces and exports up to the point where its cost advantage (disadvantage) relative to 
non-integrated firm (i.e. firm 2) equals its productivity disadvantage (advantage). An 
upward shift in relative factor cost line will lead to a reduction product range, produced 
by firm 3 and an increase in product range produced by firm 2, if there is no change in 
relative productivity of the two firms. However, there might be other factors φ which will 
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affect relative productivity. As a result, the relative productivity function may shift up or 
down. Figure 1 shows what happens if relative productivity function, A(z), shifts up. In 
this case, there is an increase in product range produced by firm 3 since the cut-off goes 
up from    to   
    
Hence, what happens to the product range would depend on not just the tariff 
change but also on all other factors affecting relative productivity of firms. In Figure 2, 
relative productivity function shifts in the downward direction. A reduction in relative 
productivity of firm 3 for all values of z, as well as a rise in relative factor cost (compared 
to firm 2) will result in an enormous reduction in product range of finished goods 
produced by firm 3. In Figure 3, the y-axis denotes relative factor costs (home/foreign) 
and relative productivities for firm 2 (home/foreign) and for firm 3 (home/foreign). On 
the horizontal axis, the continuum is arranged so that it is diminishing in home country’s 
comparative advantage in goods produced by firm 3. Let us also assume that comparative 
advantage ordering of firm 2 productivity at home is the same as it is for firm 3. The cut-
offs    and    now define the pattern of production. The middle region of the continuum 
engenders the need for vertical integration. In this region, firm 3 in home country 
produces the finished good and exports it to the foreign country. Trade affects the pattern 
of specialisation because it changes the cost of imported inputs. The range of vertical 
integration, or goods produced by firm 3, goes up as a result of a reduction in τ. This is 
accompanied by an increase in product range produced by firm 2. Thus, trade 
liberalisation in home country results in an increase in product range produced by 
vertically integrated firms as well as an increase in country-wide product range produced. 
 
4.  EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
Before we begin to explain the methodology, it would be motivating to explore 
how different these firms are in terms of key firm characteristics, such as output, number 
of physical inputs used, net profit, etc. This is imperative because if the two types of 
firms are not significantly different from each other with respect to these characteristics, 
then the difference in our estimation results could be the upshot of other factors, not 
directly measurable in the data. To investigate how different these firms are in terms of 
firm characteristics, we run the following regression: 
                                  … … … … (5) 
where VI is an indicator variable denoting a vertically integrated firm, and      are the 
different firm characteristics of firm i in year t in industry j at six-digit level, such as, 
measures of productivity used, fixed assets, size of the firm, capital intensity, net profit, 
etc. The coefficient    reports the difference across integrated and non-integrated 
clothing producers.    and    are time and industry fixed effects, respectively, and     is 
the error term. Robust standard errors are corrected for clustering at the firm level. Since 
we are interested in estimating change in productivity after the end of MFA, our main 
objective is to test if the change in these dependent and independent variables is 
significant, and whether or not it is related to vertical structure of the firm per se. 
Therefore, we replace      in Equation (5) by       : 
                                 … … … … (6) 
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Lastly, we run the same regressions but after controlling for firm’s sales:         
                        (     )                   … … (7) 
                         (     )                    … … (8) 
We use structural techniques introduced by Olley and Pakes (1996), and 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to find a measure of productivity for the firms in our 
sample. There are quite a few ways of measuring productivity change in response to a 
change in policy. The key econometric issue in the estimation of production functions is 
the likelihood that some of these inputs are unobserved, and if the observed inputs are 
chosen as a function of these unobserved inputs, then there is a possible endogeneity 
problem [Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015)]. Another source of endogeneity is sample 
selection bias; firms often exit the market when productivity drops below a specific 
threshold. Therefore, we do not rely on the OLS estimates of the observed inputs 
coefficients and instead use the methods introduced by Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP), and 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (LP) in the dynamic panel data literature.  The OP 
methodology allows for the error term to have two components, a white noise component 
and a time-varying productivity shock.
2
 Profit maximisation generates an investment 
demand function that is determined by two state variables, capital and productivity. If the 
investment demand function is monotonically increasing in productivity, it is feasible to 
invert the investment function and get an expression for productivity as a function of 
capital and investment [Pakes (1994)].  
In the actual data, however, investment is often very lumpy. This may not be in 
line with the strict monotonicity assumption regarding investment. Also, OP procedure 
can cause an efficiency loss in a data with zero investment. Instead of using an 
investment demand equation, LP uses an intermediate input demand function. Given that 
the intermediate input demands normally exhibit a lesser tendency to have zeros, the 
strict monotonicity condition is expected to hold in the LP methodology. Figure 4 shows 
mean productivity of the two types of firms computed, using three different productivity 
measures. We notice that over the entire sample period, vertically integrated clothing 
producers are much more productive than the non-integrated clothing producers, if 
productivity is computed using Levinsohn and Petrin (LP), and Olley and Pakes (OP) 
productivity measures. Whereas the average productivity of vertically-integrated clothing 
firms exhibits an upward trend, we do not see an analogous pattern for non-integrated 
clothing firms. Instead, the average productivity of non-integrated clothing firms remains 
roughly at the same level as at the start of the period.  
Figure 4 also illustrates mean productivity computed from parametric estimation 
of production functions of the two types of firms. Although estimation of production 
function coefficients may yield biased estimates of productivity, we do observe an 
upward trend in average productivity of vertically integrated clothing firms. This is again 
not true for non-integrated firms. The variation in productivity is subsequently regressed 
on the level of quotas: 
 
2It is derived from dynamic optimisation of firms, whereby it is assumed that unobserved productivity 
follows a first order Markov process and capital is accumulated by means of a deterministic dynamic 
investment process. 
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                   (        )            (        )   
                   … … … … … (9) 
where     (        )   is the logarithm of post-MFA level of quotas of product j at time 
t.      includes other control variables: size, age and capital intensity of the firm, whether 
or not the firm is ISO Certified, dummy variables for the city in which the firm is located 
and whether or not the firm is multinational, and herfindahl index of the industry. We 
expect    to be positive if an increase in the level of quotas leads to an increase in mean 
productivity of non-integrated clothing firms. Also, a negative    would signify that gain 
in productivity of vertically integrated firms is less than that in productivity of non-
integrated firms (if    is positive and |  |  |  |), or there is a significant reduction in 
mean productivity of vertically integrated firms (if    is positive and |  |  |  | ). 
Industry and year fixed effects are included in all specifications. Equation (9) is run 
separately for the different measures of productivity used. 
In addition, to test if our results differ for more capital intensive vertically 
integrated firms or firms that are bigger in size, we run analogous regressions including 
interaction terms, i.e. interaction of VI with size and capital intensity of the firm: 
                  (        )                  ( )      
                   … … … … … (10) 
                  (        )                  (  ⁄ )      
                   … … … … … (11) 
Let us look at few other key variables. Vertically integrated firms produce, on 
average, a slightly higher output than non-integrated producers. There is an upward trend 
in the output of vertically integrated firms but we do not notice a comparable trend for 
non-integrated firms. As far as labour, raw materials and other factors are concerned, we 
do not observe much difference between the two types of firms. To test whether or not 
vertically integrated clothing firms fared better than non-integrated firms in terms of 
other key measures of performance, such as output and net profit, we replace productivity 
by firms’ output and net profit in Equation (9): 
    (      )             (        )            (        )   
                   … … … … (12) 
    (          )             (        )            (        )   
                   … … … … (13) 
Control variables now also include fixed assets, raw materials and trade costs. 
Following Bernard, et al. (2006), we define industry level variable trade costs (      ) 
for six-digit NAICS industry j in year t as the sum of ad valorem duty and ad valorem 
freight and insurance rates. 
 
Data 
This paper uses balance sheet data collected in the form of a survey. The 
Balance Sheet Data of Pakistani Listed and Non-Listed Companies (BSDPC) is a 
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survey of a representative sample of 90 clothing companies in Pakistan for the years 
1992-93 to 2002-2003.
3
 The surveys are conducted by the Centre for Management 
and Economic Research (CMER) and they encompass a wide range of topics. The 
dataset covers almost all large and medium-sized formal manufacturing enterprises. 
However, coverage of the industrial sector is not complete since the informal 
enterprises are excluded and small formal firms are under-represented. The core 
survey is organised into four parts: Balance Sheet, Profit and Loss Account, Cash 
Flow Statement and Accounts Section. For each company and year, we observe the 
sales revenue, input use, investment, wage bill and all other costs, as well as industry 
codes and firm identity codes that allow us to track establishments over time. To 
estimate Equation (9) using the panel of firms, we need data on real output, capital 
stock, labour, raw materials and their respective shares in real output. Nominal 
output deflated by sectoral price deflators gives the real output.
4
 Real labour was 
found by deflating total wage bill by the industry wage rate.
5
 Materials were also 
deflated using two-digit sectoral price deflators. Real capital stock was calculated by 
deflating net fixed assets by sectoral investment deflators. Table 1 provides summary 
statistics for the balance sheet data used. This paper tracks a single country through 
time, eliminating obscuring country-specific effects. There is a notable variation in 
trade regimes between sample years which gives the analysis a laboratory-like flavor. 
We utilise the data initially used by Brambilla, et al. (2007) that traces U.S. 
trading partners’ performance under the quota regimes determined by MFA and the 
succeeding ATC. The database is assembled from U.S. trading partners’ Expired 
Performance Reports, which were used by the U.S. Office of Textile and Apparel 
(OTEXA) to supervise trading partners’ fulfillment with the MFA/ATC quotas. 
Provided by Ron Foote of the U.S. Census Bureau, they record imports, base quotas 
and quota adjustments by OTEXA category and year for all countries with which the 
U.S. negotiated a bilateral quota arrangement.
6
 The data on trade costs is taken from 
Bernard, et al. (2006) which provides data on free-on-board customs value of 
imports, ad valorem duty and ad valorem freight and insurance rates for the 
underlying four-digit product-level US import data. Obtained directly from product-
level trade data collected at the border, these trade costs take account of information 
about both trade policy and transportation costs, and they vary across industries and 
time. The next section discusses estimation results. 
 
3The data compiled by CMER only covers the period 1992 to 2003. We updated the dataset to add 
seven more years of data on sales revenue, input use, investment, etc. The paper, therefore, uses data from 1992 
to 2010. This was done in order to compute firms’ productivity during the final phase of MFA expiration as 
well, since we know that the initial phases of the ATC were not very severe for producers in developed 
countries; the U.S. postponed removal of quotas on sensitive products until Phase III. 
4The Economic Survey of Pakistan, which is published annually by the Federal Bureau of Statistics, 
Pakistan, provides industry price indices for output and intermediate inputs, which are used as deflators. 
5Real labour is taken to be the total number of employees, and not the number of hours worked, since 
hourly wage rate is not known. Many firms list the number of employees directly so there is no need to deflate 
the wage bill by the industry wage rate. 
6Base quota is the initially negotiated quota level decided at the beginning of an agreement term. 
Adjusted base quotas indicate the use of “flexibilities,” which allowed countries to go over their base quota in a 
particular period by borrowing unexploited base quota, across categories within a year and across years within a 
category, up to a specified percentage of the receiving category. 
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5.  ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
5.1.  Difference between Integrated and Non-integrated Clothing Producers 
Let us first examine the differences between these two types of firms in terms of 
output, capital stock, labour, intermediate inputs, capital intensity and net profit. This can 
be seen by looking at the firm-level relationship between these variables and integration 
status of a firm by regressing each variable on an indicator for firm’s vertical integration 
status (denoted by VI = 1 if a clothing firm is vertically integrated; VI = 0 otherwise), and 
a series of industry-year fixed effects. Consequently, the vertical integration dummy 
coefficient captures mean difference across integrated and non-integrated producers in 
the same industry and time period. This specification is helpful because it compares 
producers facing identical industry-level demand and supply conditions [Hortaçsu and 
Syverson (2006)].  
The results are shown in Tables 2 and 3. They report differences in key dependent 
and independent variables across integrated and non-integrated clothing producers. The 
reported coefficients are for the indicator variable. On average, vertically integrated 
producers have higher sales, capital stock, labour and capital intensity than non-
integrated firms but a lower level of raw materials and net profit. On the contrary, none of 
these results are statistically significant. On the other hand, coefficients for productivity 
measures (both OP as well as LP) are positive and significant in both tables. Although the 
coefficient for parametric estimate of productivity is positive but not significant, as 
shown in Table 2, it is positive and significant when the change in productivity is 
regressed on VI (look at column (3) in Table 2). We include firm’s sales as a control 
variable to prove the robustness of these results. The growth in productivity for vertically 
integrated firms is higher on average than non-integrated firms having equally sized 
sales, and the coefficients are statistically significant. 
 
5.2.  Production Function Estimates—Levinsohn and Petrin 
Table 4 reports production function estimation results for vertically integrated and 
non-integrated clothing firms using LP productivity measure. These estimates are 
employed to calculate measured TFP of a plant. The change in firm productivity is 
thenceforth regressed on the change in quotas for both types of firms (i.e. firm 2 and firm 
3 in the model above), allowing for time and industry fixed effects. This procedure is 
then repeated using OP as well as parametric estimate of productivity. The results are 
illustrated in Table 5. 
 
5.3.  Productivity and Vertical Integration 
Table 5 exhibits the effect of elimination of quota on productivity of clothing 
firms. A rise in the level of quotas brings about a drop in the productivity of non-
integrated clothing firms. This can be deduced from the negative coefficient of adjusted 
quota base in almost all specifications shown in Table 5. On the other hand, the 
coefficient for interaction term, i.e. the interaction of VI dummy with adjusted level of 
quota is positive and statistically significant: the magnitude of change in productivity for 
vertically integrated clothing producers is positive and bigger than non-integrated 
clothing firms, as there is an increase in adjusted level of quotas. 
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These results persist even when other methodologies are used to compute 
productivity, such as, running the same regression using OP semi-parametric productivity 
measure and parametric estimation of productivity.
7
 This shows that a trade liberalisation 
episode causes not just a significant change in productivity of these firms, but also that 
the results immensely differ for the two types of firms. Vertically integrated firms, 
equipped with latest machinery, supply most of the higher-quality market segments. An 
increase in adjusted level of quotas causes their productivity to go up. Quotas weaken the 
motivation to advance technologically in order to capture market share because market 
shares are predetermined, and thus, hinder productivity growth. 
Let us analyse the implications of these results in terms of the model described 
above. Figure 1 shows what happens if relative productivity function, A(z), shifts up. In 
this case, there is an increase in product range produced by firm 3 since the cut-off goes 
up from    to   
    Trade liberalisation in the form of a reduction in price of quota license 
will cause a reduction in relative factor cost of firm 2 compared to firm 3. If other factors, 
which affect relative productivity, cause relative productivity function to shift up, then 
the product range produced by vertically integrated clothing producers rises. 
We now concisely look at other control variables. For all specifications shown in 
the table, the coefficient of size is positive and statistically significant. Although capital 
intensity does not have a significant impact on productivity of clothing producers, 
nevertheless higher capital intensity is associated with higher productivity level. 
Furthermore, older firms are more productive on average. The coefficient for 
multinational dummy takes both positive and negative values and is never significant. 
The sign of herfindahl index coefficient is negative but generally insignificant. 
Alternatively, ISO Certification does affect firm efficiency significantly, when using OLS 
to compute productivity. We have taken into account the fact that some firms are located 
in more developed areas and that there may be differences in infrastructural facilities in 
different parts of the country by controlling for regional fixed effects. 
Table 6 demonstrates the effect of abolition of quotas across phases. Although a 
majority of the results described above stand across individual phases as well, some of 
the findings differ across phases and for the two types of firms. One reason is that there is 
a significant decline in the number of observations. A rise in quotas brings about a 
decrease in productivity of clothing firms that are not vertically integrated. This is true 
for all phases under LP but only for Phase IV under OP. In Phases I, II and III, the sign of 
the coefficient for level of quotas under OP is positive but insignificant. On the other 
hand, productivity of vertically integrated firms actually goes up as there is growth in 
adjusted level of quotas in all four phases, and the coefficients are statistically significant; 





7The OP and OLS results are not reported in the paper but can be made available on request. 
8The coefficients for firm characteristics are not reported in the table since most of these turned out to 
be insignificant due to a small number of observations across phases. The sign of herfindahl index coefficient is 
negative and significant in the specification for Phases I and II. This means that higher concentration in the 
industry leads to lower productivity of firms. One would normally expect that a greater degree of concentration 
in an industry leads to greater market power for firms in that industry and, hence, lower their productivity 
growth. This is the case here. 
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Table 7 displays the results we get by including the interaction of VI with firm’s 
size and capital intensity as right hand side variables. Although there is no strong 
evidence of more capital intensive integrated firms to perform better than less capital 
intensive ones, we do observe that bigger vertically integrated firms, on average, outdo 
smaller integrated firms. The only case in which the coefficients of capital intensity turn 
out to be significant is when they are positive (see columns 5 and 7). Higher capital 
intensity is expected to raise efficiency of workers and other inputs in a capital-intensive 
textile sector, although the effect may be negligible in the clothing sector which is 
relatively more labour-intensive. Since the vertically integrated firms produce both, it is 
not surprising that the overall effect is ambiguous. Nonetheless, larger firms surpass 
smaller firms. This is an interesting result which points towards the benefits of economies 
of scale enjoyed by larger companies, housing the production of their raw materials along 
with the finished product. A vertically integrated firm which operates on a smaller scale 
forgoes the cost savings which may potentially arise as a result of expanding production, 
not only to serve its own needs but also to supply intermediate goods to the rest of the 
market. 
 
5.4.  Adjusted Quotas and Other Dependent Variables 
To test whether or not vertically integrated clothing firms fared better than non-
integrated firms, in terms of other key measures of performance, such as output and net 
profit; we replace productivity by firms’ output and net profit in Equation (9). The results 
are depicted in Table 8. While the growth of quotas does lead to a higher output for 
integrated firms, the positive coefficient of the interaction term is not significant. This is 
not the case if we replace output on the left hand side by net profit: the impact on net 
profit of all clothing firms, both vertically integrated as well as non-integrated, is positive 
in all specifications used. Moreover, the coefficient of the interaction term (VI x Adjusted 
Quota) remains highly significant. This analysis makes the interpretation of estimation 
results, derived earlier, all the more fascinating. The key findings also support the results 
obtained by Braguinsky, et al. (2015), as discussed earlier. Non-integrated firms are often 
predicted to be much less profitable compared to their vertically integrated counterparts 
due to their obligation to maintain higher inventory levels and lower capacity utilisation. 
On the other hand, vertical integration substantially lowers the need to preserve greater 
inventories, and improves the ability to manage uncertainties in demand, resulting in 
higher and sustained profits. Thus, these differences merely reflect the management 
problems likely to arise under a non-integrated production setup. The challenge becomes 
more acute under growing pressures of rapid trade liberalisation. 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
Expansion of international specialisation and disintegration of production has been 
an important characteristic of the international economy. Although a variety of studies 
look into productivity gains, associated with disintegration of production across different 
countries; none of these in particular consider the effect of trade liberalisation on the 
efficiency of vertically integrated firms relative to non-integrated firms within a country. 
There is modest micro-level evidence on the productivity-integration relationship and on 
the way production differs in vertically integrated firms compared to the non-integrated 
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firms. In this paper, we compare the productivity of these two types of firms, allowing 
both types of firms to engage in international trade, and analyse how a given 
liberalisation episode affects their productivity.  
A theoretical background to vertical integration in clothing industry illustrates that 
trade liberalisation causes a change in relative factor cost of the two types of firms, and 
thus, a change in product range produced by each of them. The change in relative 
productivity of a vertically specialised firm to that of a non-vertically specialised firm 
depends, among other factors, on the change in price of the finished good as a result of 
trade liberalisation. We consider two special cases of free-trade equilibrium which 
generate complete specialisation in the production of all goods. This simple model shows 
that what happens to the product range produced by each type of firm depends on the 
change in relative factor cost and other factors affecting relative productivity of firms. 
Thus, a growth of trade in the home country results in an increase in the product range 
produced by the vertically integrated firms as well as a rise in country-wide product range 
produced. The theoretical findings of the paper are reinforced by a systematic empirical 
model by analysing the experience of clothing firms in Pakistan under the U.S. textile and 
clothing quotas and the subsequent end of MFA. This paper shows that a liberalisation 
episode may engender opposing changes in productivity of various firms even within the 
clothing industry. The empirical results show that vertical integration of production is 
linked with an improvement in productivity after trade reforms were introduced. 
To sum up, there are a large number of conceivable reasons why these results hold. 
The most cited benefits to a firm through vertical integration are decreased marketing 
expenses, stability of operations, tighter quality control, timely revision of production 
policies, guarantee of supplies, improved inventory control, and the ability to charge 
lesser prices. Vertically integrated firms respond to competition by upgrading the quality 
of their clothing products. On the other hand, it is harder to upgrade quality overnight for 
non-integrated firms. Suppliers usually control new technology in the technologically 
advanced industries and internalising these technological capabilities through vertical 
integration, promises access to the knowledge required to build a portfolio of products 
based on highly developed technology [Afuah (2001)]. Textile quality, product standards, 
fabric finishing, styles, and patterns are other factors that shape competitiveness. The 
disparity in results across garment firms may, consequently, be related to the type of raw 
materials used by garment firms after the end of MFA. Nonetheless, we do not have that 
information in our data set. The weakening efficiency of non-integrated clothing firms 
indicates the incapacity of these firms to benefit from stability of operations and 
investment in specialised assets. Greater exposure to international markets is an 
opportunity for them to downsize their input usage which can help create a competitive 
edge over other clothing exporters. 
 
  






From the first order conditions of type 2 firm, we get: 
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or if the firm buys imported raw materials: 
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From the first order conditions of type 3 firm, we obtain: 
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We can find an expression for relative productivity, 
  (  )
  (  )
  by using Eqs. (17) – 
(21): 
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Let    
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    be the ratio of the intermediate inputs purchased from type 
1 firm to the other inputs used by type 2 firm. Then the relative productivity can be 
written as: 
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In Equilibrium,   can be approximated by 
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The change in relative productivity of type 3 firm to type 2 firm depends, among 
other factors, on change in the price of finished good as a result of trade liberalisation  
 
Appendix 2 
Tables and Figures 
 
Fig. 1.  Relative Factor Costs and Relative Productivities (Firm 3/Firm 2) 
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Fig. 2.  Relative Factor Costs and Relative Productivities (Firm 3/Firm 2) 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Relative Factor Costs and Relative Productivities (Home/Foreign)
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Levinsohn & Petrin








Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation 
Log (Sales) 4717 19.25 3.73 
Log (Fixed Assets) 4718 11.50    9.51 
Log (Labour) 4718 16.36     1.93 
Log (Raw Materials) 4718 18.71     3.58 
Log (Net Profit) 4718 12.99     10.32 
Log (Investment) 4813 4.01     7.22 
Productivity (Levinsohn and Petrin) 4717 10.55     5.72 
Productivity (Olley and Pakes) 4717 1.87     3.04 
Productivity (OLS) 4717 -8.85e-10      1.88 
Age 2895 23.78     16.10 
Log (Age) 2846 2.97     0.82 
Log (Capital to Labour ratio) 4407 0.73     0.58 
Herfindahl Index 4813 0.82     0.62 
ISO Certified 4606 0.67     0.47 
Multinational 4606 0.10     0.30 
Share of Foreign Ownership  4436 0.22     0.41 
Exporting firm 4606 0.88     0.33 
Importing firm 4606 0.42    0.49 
Log (Cost of Imports) 2385 0.15 0.11 
Log (Adjusted Base New) 3980 29.11 16.11 
Log (Adjusted Base) 2499 16.73 1.13 
Log (Imports) 1544 16.43 2.01 
Average Fill Rate 2143 0.81 0.19 
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Table 2 
Differences between Integrated and Non-integrated Clothing Producers 
Variables LP OP OLS Fixed Assets Sales Raw Materials Net Profit Size 
Capital 
Intensity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VI 15.57*** 8.591*** 0.0688 2.154 0.00736 -0.505 -0.383 0.0520 0.120 
 (0.280) (0.553) (0.438) (1.979) (1.160) (1.041) (2.210) (0.253) (0.119) 
Constant 0.402** -1.351*** 0.299 2.631* 19.08*** 18.40*** 21.95*** 16.25*** 0.140* 
 (0.191) (0.453) (0.418) (1.386) (0.870) (0.671) (1.558) (0.365) (0.0810) 
No. of 
Observations 1255 1255 1255 1255 1255 1255 1255 1255 1254 
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm level in parentheses. Industry-year fixed 
effects are included in all specifications. Coefficients for the industry and year dummies are suppressed. 
The reported coefficients are those for an indicator variable, VI, denoting that a firm is vertically 
integrated. *** Significant at, or below, 1 percent. ** Significant at, or below, 5 percent. * Significant 
at, or below, 10 percent. 
 
Table 3 
Differences between Integrated and Non-integrated Clothing Producers— 








Change in  
LP 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VI 0.759** 0.627* 0.602** 0.784** 0.582** 0.572 
 (0.374) (0.358) (0.235) (0.370) (0.271) (0.419) 
Sales    0.154** 0.452*** 0.377*** 
    (0.0788) (0.0500) (0.0601) 
Constant -0.403 -0.499 -0.259 -3.304** -8.872*** -7.263*** 
 (0.518) (0.565) (0.506) (1.571) (1.068) (1.259) 
No. of Observations 1237 1237 1237 1237 1237 1237 
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm level in parentheses. Industry-year fixed 
effects are included in all specifications. Coefficients for the industry and year dummies are suppressed. 
The reported coefficients are those for an indicator variable, VI, denoting that a firm is vertically 
integrated. *** Significant at, or below, 1 percent. ** Significant at, or below, 5 percent. * Significant 
at, or below, 10 percent. 
 
Table 4 
Production Function Estimates for Vertically Integrated and 
Non-integrated Clothing Firms 
 Vertically Integrated Clothing Non-integrated Clothing 
 (1) (2) 
Employment 0.169*** 0.355*** 
 (0.0596) (0.0362) 
Fixed Assets 0.00113 0.00719 
 (0.00716) (0.0142) 
Raw Materials 0.0553 0.999*** 
 (0.310) (0.313) 
No. of Observations 490 953 
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm level in parentheses. *** Significant at, or 
below, 1 percent. ** Significant at, or below, 5 percent. * Significant at, or below, 10 percent. 




Effect of Elimination of Quota-Restrictions on Productivity of Clothing Firms— 
Levinsohn and Petrin 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Adjusted Quota -0.155** -0.159** -0.155** -0.155** -0.155* -0.172* -0.144 -0.154 
 (0.0779) (0.0803) (0.0782) (0.0782) (0.0836) (0.0952) (0.124) (0.136) 
VI x AdjQuota 0.0261** 0.0273** 0.0269** 0.0269** 0.0271** 0.0297** 0.0266 0.0270 
 (0.0119) (0.0128) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0125) (0.0131) (0.0182) (0.0192) 
Herfindahl Index  -0.0314 -0.0302 -0.0296 -0.0578 -0.0691 -0.0501 -0.0505 
  (0.0557) (0.0556) (0.0556) (0.0572) (0.0577) (0.0519) (0.0527) 
Multinational   0.601 0.695 0.682 0.682 1.839 0.390 
   (0.599) (0.647) (0.654) (0.646) (1.753) (0.661) 
ISO Certified    -0.468 -0.506 -0.512 -0.979 -0.513 
    (0.799) (0.794) (0.790) (1.289) (0.453) 
K/L (Lagged)     0.136 0.171 0.171 0.176 
     (0.131) (0.137) (0.176) (0.183) 
Size (Lagged)      0.0393* 0.0570** 0.0575** 
      (0.0209) (0.0249) (0.0249) 
Age       1.117* 1.103** 
       (0.590) (0.507) 
Age2       -0.279 -0.282* 
       (0.228) (0.166) 
Constant 0 8.201** 0 0 0 8.658* 0 6.542 
 (0) (3.928) (0) (0) (0) (4.854) (0) (7.022) 
         
City Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Industry/Time Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 948 948 948 948 896 896 555 555 
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm level in parentheses. Coefficients for the 
industry and year dummies are suppressed. *** Significant at, or below, 1 percent. ** Significant at, or 
below, 5 percent. * Significant at, or below, 10 percent.  
 
Table 6 
Effect of Elimination of Quota-Restrictions on Productivity of Clothing Firms across 
Phases—Using Levinsohn and Petrin and Olley and Pakes Productivity Measures 
Variable Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 
 LP OP LP OP LP OP LP OP 
Adjusted Quota -0.104 0.275 -0.0474 0.470 -0.0435 0.278 -0.0302 -0.35*** 
 (0.0960) (0.938) (0.0596) (0.364) (0.160) (0.231) (0.0384) (0.0545) 
VI x AdjQuota 1.002*** 0.480*** 1.021*** 0.519*** 0.984*** 0.617*** 0.346*** 0.189*** 
 (0.0221) (0.0636) (0.0269) (0.0840) (0.0355) (0.0532) (0.0100) (0.0129) 
Industry/Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 107 107 160 160 66 66 192 192 
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm level in parentheses. Coefficients for the 
industry and year dummies are suppressed. The coefficients for firm characteristics are not reported. *** 
Significant at, or below, 1 percent. ** Significant at, or below, 5 percent. * Significant at, or below, 10 
percent.  
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Table 7 
Effect of Elimination of Quota-Restrictions on Productivity of Clothing Firms—
Interaction of Vertically Integrated Indicator Variable (VI) with  
Firm’s Size and Capital Intensity 
 Interaction of VI with  
Firm’s Size 
Interaction of VI with Firm’s Capital 
Intensity 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Adjusted Quota -0.0163 -0.0104 -0.00304 -0.105 0.0970 -0.0673 -0.0553 -0.203 
 (0.0754) (0.0780) (0.0792) (0.122) (0.0677) (0.102) (0.0640) (0.166) 
VI 13.1*** 13.2*** 13.0*** 13.1*** 15.3*** 14.3*** 14.8*** 14.3*** 
 (0.996) (0.970) (0.981) (1.145) (0.563) (0.664) (0.602) (1.060) 
Size (Lagged) -0.0080 -0.0086 0.00505 -0.00410  0.059** 0.08*** 0.0792* 
 (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0280) (0.0456)  (0.0231) (0.0282) (0.0437) 
VI x Size (Lagged) 0.108** 0.108** 0.118** 0.138**     
 (0.0476) (0.0472) (0.0469) (0.0611)     
K/L (Lagged)   0.293 0.524 0.148** 0.0545 -0.178* 0.0452 
   (0.209) (0.383) (0.0698) (0.0559) (0.0916) (0.0732) 
VI x K/L (Lagged)     0.0479 0.521 0.917** 0.817 
     (0.292) (0.399) (0.432) (0.549) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
No. of Observations 566 566 565 347 896 565 347 347 
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm level in parentheses. VI is an indicator variable 
denoting a vertically integrated clothing firm. The coefficients for firm characteristics are not reported, 
and coefficients for the industry and year dummies are suppressed. *** Significant at, or below, 1 
percent. ** Significant at, or below, 5 percent. * Significant at, or below, 10 percent. 
 
Table 8 
Effect of Elimination of Quota-Restrictions on Net Profit and Output of Clothing Firms 
 Net Profit Output 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Raw Materials 0.319*** 0.109* 0.127* 0.231*** 0.0273 0.0559 
 (0.0970) (0.0592) (0.0705) (0.0721) (0.0308) (0.0360) 
Employment 0.388*** 0.162** 0.112 0.121*** 0.107* 0.141** 
 (0.0599) (0.0667) (0.0934) (0.0359) (0.0627) (0.0582) 
Fixed Assets -0.933*** -0.686*** -0.822*** 0.0221* 0.0943** 0.116** 
 (0.0342) (0.129) (0.103) (0.0122) (0.0478) (0.0543) 
Adjusted Quota -0.123 0.409 1.175*** -0.351 1.003** 1.048** 
 (0.327) (0.326) (0.300) (0.295) (0.419) (0.440) 
VI x Adjusted Quota 0.0106 0.161*** 0.235*** 0.0204 0.0979 0.0335 
 (0.0289) (0.0497) (0.0530) (0.0277) (0.0975) (0.112) 
Industry/Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
No. of Observations 948 617 374 948 374 374 
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm level in parentheses. The coefficients for firm 
characteristics are not reported, and coefficients for the industry and year dummies are suppressed. *** 
Significant at, or below, 1 percent. ** Significant at, or below, 5 percent. * Significant at, or below, 10 
percent. 
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